Available Online: 6 March 2026 DOI: 10.54254/2977-5701/2026.32118

War risk, risk aversion motivations, and China's energy investment in Belt and Road countries: evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Benyi Wan, Qi Li*

Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China

*Corresponding Author. Email: lq202205@163.com

Abstract. This study investigates the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on Chinese enterprises' overseas energy investments, focusing on how geopolitical risks shape investment decisions. Using a Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach and data from 2014 to 2023, the research examines whether the conflict has driven Chinese firms to reallocate energy investments to mitigate disruptions to China's energy supply. The findings reveal a significant increase in China's energy investments in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries, reflecting a strategic shift toward politically stable and economically viable regions, driven by risk aversion motives. This trend is consistent across various tests. The study also explores heterogeneity in investment behavior, state-owned enterprises and investments in new energy, particularly renewables. Mechanism analysis highlights China-host relations, infrastructure aid, and non-greenfield controls as key shift drivers. Research shows Chinese firms adopt risk-averse strategies to secure energy, offering insights for policymakers amid geopolitical market uncertainties.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine conflict, Belt and Road initiative, risk aversion motives, energy investment

1. Introduction

The energy industry plays a crucial role as a fundamental support for economic development. China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) in energy, primarily aimed at resource-seeking, demonstrates distinct characteristics compared to general OFDI [1]. Energy OFDI not only focuses on economic returns but also emphasizes the stabilization of political relations [2]. It also pays attention to the effectiveness of foreign aid and the compatibility with the development of host countries [3]. China's support in energy technology and the demand for transformation have driven the development of energy OFDI. The complexity and instability of the global energy market compel China to construct a diversified global energy layout strategy. In this strategy, the stability of political relations is a significant consideration for energy investment. Among these, extreme risks such as war notably impact energy investments [4]. As a major country in global energy investment, stable energy import channels are vital for ensuring energy security and the smooth operation of the economy in China. Therefore, in energy investment decision-making, China conducts a comprehensive assessment of the political, economic, and geopolitical environments of host countries. This thorough evaluation generates a

strong risk aversion motive, which is crucial for stabilizing China's energy OFDI, ensuring national energy security, and enhancing its competitiveness in the international energy sector.

Existing research indicates that the risk aversion mechanism in energy investment is constructed based on its unique industry characteristics and investment motivations [5]. This includes high sensitivity to war, long investment cycles, and the vulnerability of infrastructures. Once war breaks out, it can directly destroy military and energy infrastructure and may also lead to a complete paralysis of national industries by disrupting energy supply chains. Therefore, avoiding war risks becomes a primary principle in energy investment [6]. This risk aversion mechanism necessitates that investors deeply assess the political stability, military conflict risks, and subtle changes in international relations of potential investment regions from the outset to minimize the negative impacts of war on energy investment projects. By diversifying investment portfolios, establishing risk warning and response mechanisms, and strengthening cooperation and communication with the international community, China strives to build an efficient and comprehensive risk aversion system for energy investments.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict, as a complex geopolitical issue, reflects profound contradictions between great power rivalry and regional security [7]. This proxy war not only directly relates to the fates of Russia and Ukraine but also significantly impacts the global energy market's landscape. Although China maintains a neutral stance, it cannot avoid being affected by the conflict due to its significant energy investment layout on the Eurasian continent. Especially against the backdrop of its energy transition, how to effectively adjust energy investment strategies becomes even more crucial. Since the successful convening of the Belt and Road Forum in 2017, international cooperation between China and Belt and Road countries has increasingly strengthened. The Belt and Road Initiative has become China's preferred geographical strategy. As one of the earlier areas of investment cooperation along the Belt and Road, energy is a key focus area for the initiative [8]. The countries along the route are China's geographical neighbors, most of which share similar cultural backgrounds, and hold irreplaceable positions in terms of geographical and cultural proximity, diplomatic foundations, and political relationships.

Therefore, this study takes the Russia-Ukraine conflict of 2021 as a natural experiment to analyze the changes in China's energy investments in Belt and Road countries before and after the conflict, examining the impact of warfare on China's energy sector OFDI and the trend of risk aversion in energy investments. The research shows that after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the overall scale and regional distribution of China's energy OFDI underwent certain adjustments. Specifically, in terms of total amount, the growth rate of investments slowed, reflecting a cautious attitude towards investment risks; in terms of regional distribution, investments in countries directly related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict significantly decreased, while those in countries and regions with political stability and better economic foundations increased. This adjustment highlights the flexibility and adaptability of Chinese energy investments, providing important references for seeking safer and more sustainable development paths in the global energy market. The following will visually present these changes on a map, marking the countries/regions with decreased investment in blue and those with increased investment in red, with varying shades indicating the degree of change, as shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Diagram of changes in China's overseas energy investment after the Russia-Ukraine conflict

2. Literature review

The literature on the investment environment of host countries and energy OFDI primarily focuses on the factors influencing energy OFDI. Issues such as the economic development of host countries [9, 10], institutional environments [11-13], and resource endowments [13] all affect China's energy OFDI. this study mainly explores how the war risks in host countries influence the flows of energy OFDI. The specific discussion can be divided into two categories.

First, the dynamic relationship between national policy and energy OFDI under war risks in host countries [14-17]. When extreme events occur in the international energy market, countries that primarily rely on foreign energy supply face relatively high risks of supply disruptions [18]. Taking China as an example, its excessive dependency on specific oil-producing countries and specific transport routes puts China in a vulnerable position [6]. To maintain a stable supply, importers often need to maintain good diplomatic relations with oil-producing countries. Zhang and Hao point out a significant positive relationship between political relations and China's OFDI; Chinese enterprises prefer to invest and trade with developing countries that have good diplomatic ties. Some studies also emphasize the close relationship between China's foreign policy and its energy cooperation partners [4]. In summary, the outbreak of geopolitical risk events poses a threat to China's energy security, making it particularly crucial to timely adjust energy OFDI strategies to mitigate the negative impacts of war on energy investment projects.

Second, how enterprises adjust their investment decisions in response to the emergence of geopolitical risks in host countries. Geopolitical risks increase the difficulty of daily operations for enterprises and reduce their enthusiasm for investing in that country, affecting the capital flow between China and the host country [19, 20]. Hence, enterprises tend to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and may delay sunk investments based on the nature of the investments when facing risks in the host country [21]. Some studies find that political risks in host countries reduce the OFDI of multinational enterprises [22, 23]. Ying Z et al. [24] further reveal that state-owned enterprises and private enterprises exhibit heterogeneous investment strategies in the face of risks in host countries. Meanwhile, political uncertainty leads to reduced economic activities and falling stock prices [22, 25, 26], further increasing uncertainty regarding future economic conditions and policies, negatively impacting the decisions of domestic and foreign investors [27]. Existing research mainly describes the risks faced by investments due to domestic political changes or the deterioration of bilateral relations, while the specific impact of geopolitical events and how uncertainties influence investment behavior remains a topic of

discussion. This research aims to analyze how enterprises manage risks and reallocate investments when faced with specific geopolitical threats.

The aforementioned research provides vital references for understanding the rules of international capital flows under the backdrop of war, but there are still some shortcomings. Although the correlation between geopolitical events and investment has been discussed, the effect of geopolitical events has not been clearly defined. Meanwhile, as important partners for China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) in the energy sector, the "Belt and Road" countries have not been explored in existing studies regarding the investment transfer effect of China's energy OFDI in these countries under the war risk. Therefore, this paper attempts to innovate in the following two aspects: First, from the research perspective, this study uses the Russia-Ukraine conflict as an exogenous shock. Different from previous studies that mostly used domestic political transitions or deteriorating bilateral relations to describe investment risks, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is not only directly related to the fates of Russia and Ukraine but also has a significant impact on the global energy market pattern. Taking this as a research shock can more clearly observe the impact of war risks on energy investment and provide a new perspective for studying the laws of international capital flows. In addition, since the "Belt and Road" countries are important partners for China's energy OFDI, analyzing the changes in China's energy investment in the countries along the "Belt and Road" before and after the conflict provides a basis for understanding China's energy investment strategy adjustment in a specific region.

Second, in terms of the impact mechanism, this paper reveals the internal mechanisms of energy investment changes from multiple dimensions based on the intimacy between countries, types of assistance, and investment methods. After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Chinese enterprises are more inclined to invest in countries with small cultural differences, geographical proximity, those within the same cultural circle, mutual visa-free treatment, and friendly relations. Cultural and geographical factors reduce cooperation risks. Infrastructure assistance has a greater promoting effect on energy investment than non-infrastructure assistance. At the same time, Chinese enterprises mostly increase their energy investment in the "Belt and Road" countries through non-greenfield investments, and they prefer the form of holding shares in non-greenfield investments, leveraging existing resources for layout and risk control. Analyzing the internal driving factors of the changes in China's energy investment in the "Belt and Road" countries after the Russia-Ukraine conflict provides strong support for policy-making and enterprise investment decisions.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and data. Section 4 presents the results of the baseline regression and conducts a series of robustness checks. Section 5 explores the heterogeneity effects. Section 6 examines the mechanisms behind the baseline results. Section 7 concludes with implications and policy recommendations.

3. Sample selection and model specification

3.1. Sample selection

This study aims to explore the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on China's energy investments in Belt and Road countries. The data on China's foreign energy investments comes from the "China Global Investment Tracker" database, publicly available from the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. This database includes information such as date, investment company name, host country, investment amount, and investment type for each investment. The complete sample encompasses energy investments by Chinese enterprises in 98 countries from 2014 to 2023 in the CGIT, constructing a "country-year" panel data for the research, The sample consists of China's ten - year overseas energy investment data for 98 countries, with a total of 980 observations. Considering that China increased its energy investments in surrounding countries

following the introduction of the Belt and Road policy (2014), we designated the treatment group as Belt and Road countries and the control group as other countries, using the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a natural experiment, with 2021 as the year of the shock, to construct a difference-in-differences model.

3.2. Model specification

This study uses the Russia-Ukraine conflict as an exogenous shock within the Difference-in-Differences (DID) framework. The DID model primarily estimates the intervention effect by comparing the differences in changes before and after the intervention between the treatment group and the control group. By controlling for other potential influencing factors, relatively accurate estimates of the intervention effect can be obtained. The DID model has been widely applied in the study of policy impacts, social reforms, and other areas. Prior to conducting the DID test, a parallel trend test is performed to eliminate selection bias and effectively avoid issues of estimation bias. In this study, a random sampling method is used to conduct a placebo test for the DID model. The treatment group is designated as Belt and Road countries, while the control group consists of other countries, using the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a natural experiment, with 2021 as the year of the shock, to construct the difference-in-differences model. The model specification is as follows (Equation (1)):

$$investment_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 time \times treat + \beta_2 X_{it} + \delta_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

Where $investment_{it}$ represents China's energy investment in country i in year t, and $time$ represents a dummy variable for the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, if the year is greater than 2021, it equals 1, otherwise 0. treat represents a dummy variable for Belt and Road countries: if the country is along the Belt and Road, it equals 1, otherwise 0. $time \times treat$ is the interaction term between the time dummy variable and the treatment group dummy variable. Xit represents a set of control variables, including economic indicators of country i and bilateral indicators between country i and China in year t. δi and δt represent country fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively, while ε_{it} is the random error term.

Dependent Variable: Log of Total Outward Investment (investment): The logarithm of China's total outward energy investment, measuring the scale of China's investments in the energy sector of host countries.

Key Explanatory Variables: In the research examining the impact of the Russia - Ukraine conflict on the overseas energy investments of Chinese - related enterprises, based on China's overseas energy investment data from 2014 to 2023, a variety of control variables are incorporated to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the results.

In terms of economic indicators, the logarithm of per capita GDP, the degree of foreign trade dependence, the ratio of FDI to GDP, and the proportions of value - added of the secondary industry and the service industry in GDP are used to control, respectively, the impacts of the host country's economic strength, openness, foreign - investment - attraction capacity, and industrial structure on China's overseas investments. Regarding energy indicators, the nitrous oxide emissions of the energy sector are selected to control the effect of the host country's energy situation. For social indicators, the logarithm of the total population and the urbanization rate are adopted to consider the influences of population size and urbanization level on investments. Additionally, the economic freedom index and the political stability index are chosen to control, respectively, the interference of the host country's economic policy liberalization degree and political stability on investments.

The data of these control variables are sourced from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Development Indicators. Missing values are filled through interpolation.

4. Baseline regression results

The prerequisite for Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation is that the treatment group and the control group are comparable before the event occurs. To test if the parallel trends assumption is met, we employed the following model (Equation (2)):

$$investment_{it} = \beta_0 + \sum_{t=-7}^{t=+2} \beta_t treat + \gamma_1 treat + \gamma_2 time + \delta_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

In this model, $investment_{it}$ represents the investment level of the i individual in period t; β_0 is the constant term; β_t is the coefficient related to the $treat$ variable, reflecting the impact of the $treat$ variable on $investment_{it}$ in different periods. The $treat$ is a grouping variable used to distinguish between the treatment group and the control group, usually taking a value of 0 (control group) or 1 (treatment group). γ_1 is the coefficient of the $treat$ variable, measuring the overall difference between the treatment group and the control group. The $time$ represents the time variable, reflecting the impact of time factors on the investment level; γ_2 is the coefficient of the $time$ variable. δ_i represents the individual fixed effect, controlling the impact of characteristics at the individual level that do not change over time on the investment level. δ_t represents the time fixed effect, controlling the impact of factors that change over time but are the same for all individuals on the investment level. ε_{it} is the random error term, representing the unexplained part in the model. To test the parallel trends assumption in the empirical section, we will examine if the pre-treatment trends of the outcome variable for the treatment group and the control group show statistically similar patterns before the intervention.



Figure 2. Parallel trends test chart

Figure 2 is a parallel trends test graph. As shown in the graph, before the Russo-Ukrainian conflict occurred, China's energy investments in the Belt and Road Initiative did not demonstrate a significant impact. However, post the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, China's energy investments in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative increased significantly.

4.1. Placebo test

In the empirical part of this study, when conducting the placebo test (as shown in Figure 3), a false treatment effect was applied to the outcome variable. This entails artificially setting up a "shock" that does not actually exist. It is as if we fabricated an event similar to the Russia - Ukraine conflict but which, in reality, does not have a genuine impact on Chinese enterprises' overseas energy investments, and then applied this as a "treatment" to the data. Subsequently, by observing the distribution of all parameter coefficient estimates, it

was found that they were all close to a normal distribution, with the mean approaching zero. This result holds significant implications: 1. Close to normal distribution with the mean approaching zero**: This indicates that under the application of the false treatment effect, no systematic and significant results were generated. If there were significant errors in the estimation results, such as being affected by unobserved confounding variables or having model - setting errors, then when applying the false treatment, the parameter coefficient estimates might exhibit an abnormal distribution instead of a normal distribution with the mean approaching zero. 2. Consistent with the expected results of the placebo test**: This distribution that conforms to expectations suggests that the estimated actual treatment effect of the Russia - Ukraine conflict on Chinese enterprises' overseas energy investments obtained in this study is relatively reliable. Since a reasonable result with no significant effect was obtained when using the false treatment, we can be relatively more confident that the effect brought about by the previous observed real "treatment" (the Russia - Ukraine conflict) is real, rather than an illusion caused by data or model problems.



Figure 3. Placebo test diagram

Table 1 presents the results of the DID estimation. The table 1 below reports the baseline regression results of China's energy investment in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative after the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Column (1) displays the results without including control variables, while column (3) shows the results after including control variables. The results indicate that after the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Chinese enterprises increased their energy investment in Belt and Road countries by 0.61 units.

Table 1. Baseline regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	IN_q	IN_q	IN_q
did	0.585***	0.574***	0.610***
	(0.179)	(0.185)	(0.193)
lncapita		0.553	0.566
		(0.469)	(0.493)
FDI to GDP		0.00178	0.00146
		(0.00286)	(0.00288)

Table 1. Continued

Lnpop		0.818	0.723
		(1.009)	(1.057)
Sec		-0.0178	-0.0350***
		(0.0118)	(0.0129)
EFI		-0.00120	0.00162
		(0.0107)	(0.0104)
Pvr			0.0349
			(0.198)
TradeofGDP			-0.00344
			(0.00342)
Urban			-0.0760
			(0.0648)
Services			-0.0224*
			(0.0133)
ln_energy_co2			0.0491
			(0.0610)
Constant	0.610***	-17.78	-10.21
	(0.0428)	(18.65)	(19.18)
Observations	980	980	980
R-squared	0.425	0.429	0.432
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

4.2. Robustness tests

To further confirm the reliability of the research conclusions, various robustness tests were conducted. The first test involved changing the dependent variable. Generally, an increase in investment can be reflected in both the amount of investment and the number of investment occurrences. Therefore, replacing the investment amount with the number of investment occurrences, the results in Table 2 (first column) show that Chinese energy investments in Belt and Road countries significantly increased in frequency after the Russo-Ukrainian War. Secondly, in order to reduce the impact of outliers on the results, a Winsorization method was used, as shown in the second column of the table. Since omitted variables included in the random error term may cause endogeneity issues if they are correlated with other explanatory variables, leading to biased regression results, and from a practical perspective, the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict may have lag effects. Therefore, the explanatory variables were lagged by one period, as shown in the third column of the table, where the coefficients are significantly positive and pass the robustness tests, as shown in table 2.

Table 2. Robustness tests

	investment frequency	trimming	lagged method
VARIABLES		IN_q	IN_q
did	0.640**	0.581***	
	(0.247)	(0.186)	
L.did			0.827***

Table 2. Continued

			(0.205)
Constant	-3.952	-10.38	-7.337
	(21.72)	(19.17)	(21.68)
Observations	980	980	882
R-squared	0.490	0.434	0.485
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Control	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Since the "Belt and Road" countries are not randomly selected, it may lead to an endogeneity problem in the data. Therefore, this study uses the countries along the ancient Silk Road as instrumental variables for further verification. The time span of the ancient Silk Road and the "Belt and Road" Initiative is relatively large, and there is no direct temporal connection between them, which satisfies the exogeneity condition. At the same time, reviving the ancient Silk Road is one of the starting points of the "Belt and Road" Initiative, indicating a correlation between them. Specifically, if a country along the "Belt and Road" Initiative is also a country along the ancient Silk Road, the variable "whether it is a Silk Road country" is assigned a value of 1; otherwise, it is assigned a value of 0. Specifically, the interaction term between "whether it is an ancient Silk Road country" and the time dummy variable is incorporated into the model for verification. The regression results are shown in Table 3. The coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive at the 1% level. That is, after fully considering the endogeneity problem, the research hypothesis still holds. In addition, this instrumental variable has passed the under - identification test, the weak instrument test, and the over - identification test, further verifying the robustness and reliability of the research results.

Based on the actual situation, because the list of countries involved in the "Belt and Road" project is not randomly generated, the instrumental variable method is adopted to address the endogeneity problem of the data. Instrumental variables must meet the requirements of exogeneity and correlation. Thus, the countries along the ancient Silk Road are used as instrumental variables. From the perspective of exogeneity, the time of the ancient Silk Road is far different from that of the "Belt and Road" Initiative. From the perspective of correlation, reviving the ancient Silk Road is one of the starting points of the "Belt and Road" Initiative. Therefore, the interaction term between the ancient Silk Road countries and the time dummy variable is used as the instrumental variable. When a country along the "Belt and Road" Initiative is an ancient Silk Road country, the value of whether it is a Silk Road country is 1, otherwise 0. The obtained regression results are shown in the following table. According to the regression results, the coefficient of did is significantly positive at the 1% level. In conclusion, after considering the endogeneity problem, the research hypothesis still holds. And it has passed the under-identification test, the weak instrument test, and the over-identification test.

Table 3. Endogeneity tests

	(1)	
VARIABLES	did	IN_q
iv	0.137***	
	(0.0317)	
did		0.218***

Table 3. Continued

		(0.0599)
lncapita	-0.141	-0.00929
	(0.0860)	(0.0184)
FDI to GDP	0.000532	0.000256
	(0.000995)	(0.000819)
Lnpop	0.473**	0.0334***
	(0.187)	(0.00749)
Sec	0.00122	0.00245**
	(0.00347)	(0.00124)
EFI	-0.000879	0.000434
	(0.00216)	(0.00123)
Pvr	-0.0116	0.00380
	(0.0337)	(0.0160)
TradeofGDP	0.000224	4.93e-05
	(0.000689)	(0.000209)
Urban	0.0430***	-0.000136
	(0.0103)	(0.000543)
Services	0.00370	-0.000639
	(0.00331)	(0.00148)
ln_energy_co2	0.0718***	0.0174***
	(0.0171)	(0.00556)
Constant	-9.590***	-0.495***
	(3.368)	(0.153)
Observations	980	980
R-squared	0.830	0.440
unobservable heterogeneity		20.898
(Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic)		0.0000
weak instruments (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)		18.782
overidentification test Sargan statistic		0.0000

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

5. Heterogeneity

Table 4. Heterogeneity of investment enterprises and host countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	state-owned	non-state-owned	IN_q
did	0.746**	0.497	0.393**
	(0.355)	(0.341)	(0.173)
did×energy-rich country			0.415**
			(0.180)
Constant	-32.12	31.62	-3.387
	(32.56)	(27.82)	(19.10)
Observations	980	980	980

Table 4. Continued

R-squared	0.407	0.322	0.450
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

5.1. Heterogeneity of enterprise nature

In China, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) hold a unique economic position, characterized by closer ties to government, stronger capital backing, and more comprehensive corporate governance systems, as well as a greater responsibility for social obligations. Therefore, it is significant to explore how enterprises with different ownership structures impact energy investments in Belt and Road countries following the Russia-Ukraine conflict. this study divides the entire sample into two sub-samples based on whether they are state-owned enterprises, and conducts group tests using a baseline regression model.

Table 4 reports the results of enterprise heterogeneity. Column (1) presents the data for state-owned enterprises, while Column (2) presents that for non-state-owned enterprises. Compared to non-state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises invest more in energy, and their coefficients are more significant. This might be because SOEs are often guided by government policies; the Russia-Ukraine conflict may impose certain political risks on Belt and Road investments, prompting the government to enhance energy investments through SOEs to safeguard national interests and stability.

Additionally, state-owned enterprises typically possess more funding and resources, enabling them to undertake larger investment projects, especially in areas with higher political risks where their financial strength offers an advantage. Finally, political turbulence and conflicts may challenge investment security, and SOEs usually have stronger security assurance capabilities and a greater need for actual control, making them more inclined to increase investments in complex situations.

5.2. Classification by host country

Table 5. Types of energy

VARIABLES	new energy	renewable energy	hydropower	traditional energy
did	0.730***	0.584***	0.402***	0.0444
	(0.183)	(0.155)	(0.107)	(0.0705)
Constant	1.418	-0.644	-4.433	-3.931
	(17.57)	(12.48)	(9.765)	(11.16)
Observations	980	980	980	980
R-squared	0.432	0.271	0.328	0.286
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

Host countries are categorized based on their energy reserves, distinguishing between energy-rich and non-energy-rich countries. Specifically, countries with energy reserves above the mean are classified as energy-rich

(coded as 1), while those below the mean are classified as non-energy-rich (coded as 0). The results are shown in Column (3) of Table 4, which introduces the interaction term did × whether the country is an energy-rich country for heterogeneity testing. The results indicate a significantly positive interaction term, suggesting that Chinese enterprises are more inclined to invest in energy-rich countries within the Belt and Road framework, which aligns with China's current policy focus on strengthening energy cooperation with resource-rich countries.

5.3. Analysis of different types of energy

For different energy types, this study initially classifies them into new energy and traditional energy. Oil, coal, and natural gas are categorized as traditional energy, while renewable and hydropower are categorized as new energy. Columns (1) and (4) of Table 5 present the regression results for new energy and traditional energy, respectively. The results indicate that the coefficient for new energy is more significant compared to that of traditional energy. Therefore, following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Chinese enterprises predominantly invest in new energy in Belt and Road countries. This could be attributed to the decentralized nature of new energy, which helps reduce dependency on traditional energy supplies and enhances China's energy security in the Belt and Road region. Thus, increasing investments in new energy also serves as a means to mitigate risks.

Moreover, new energy is further subdivided into renewable energy and hydropower. Columns (2) to (3) of the table report the regression results, which reveal that after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Chinese enterprises primarily increased their investments in renewable energy within the new energy sector in Belt and Road countries.

Table 6. NATO countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	IN_q	traditional energy	new energy
did	0.779***	0.796***	0.0547
	(0.197)	(0.188)	(0.0798)
did×NATO	-0.490**	-0.468**	-0.0734
	(0.237)	(0.205)	(0.121)
Constant	2.838	6.208	-3.179
	(19.32)	(18.24)	(11.53)
Observations	980	980	980
R-squared	0.413	0.333	0.287
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is not merely a clash between two countries; it actually represents a conflict between two camps: one led by NATO and the other by Russia. The countries are classified into NATO and non-NATO countries based on whether the host country is a NATO member. An interaction term did × whether it is a NATO country is introduced for heterogeneity testing, and the results are shown in Table 6. The interaction term is significantly negative, indicating that after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Chinese enterprises reduced their energy investments in NATO countries, subsequently increasing their investments in Belt and Road countries.

Furthermore, energy investment types are categorized into traditional energy and new energy. The results are illustrated in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6, where the interaction term for new energy investments is significantly negative, indicating that Chinese enterprises significantly decreased their investments in new energy in NATO countries while increasing their investments in new energy in Belt and Road countries.

Table 7. Whether it is a first-time investment

VARIABLES	first-time	non-first-time
did	0.0574*	0.553***
	(0.0310)	(0.197)
Constant	-8.812	-1.401
	(5.780)	(19.04)
Observations	980	980
R-squared	0.126	0.450
Country FE	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

Table 8. Regional distribution of investment enterprises and tariff barriers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	coastal cities	border cities	western region	IN_q
did	0.632***	0.0670*	0.399**	0.714***
	(0.187)	(0.0397)	(0.183)	(0.199)
tariff share				0.00489
				(0.00782)
did×tariff share				-0.0291*
				(0.0175)
Constant	-16.47	-0.181	-4.052	-7.962
	(17.21)	(4.731)	(16.65)	(20.06)
Observations	980	980	980	980
R-squared	0.438	0.355	0.465	0.442
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

Countries are classified into first-time investments and non-first-time investments based on whether there was only one investment during the sample period. The results are presented in Table 7, where Column (1) reports the regression results for first-time investments, while Column (2) presents those for non-first-time investments. The results indicate that the coefficient for non-first-time investments is more significant and higher than that for first-time investments, suggesting that after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China's energy investments in Belt and Road countries with previous investment connections are greater than those in countries with only a one-time investment connection. This is likely because a cooperative relationship has been established with countries that have previous investment ties, fostering a degree of trust

and stability between both parties. Consequently, China is more willing to continue its energy investments in these countries to maintain the stability of the cooperative relationship.

This study also examines the regional distribution of domestic investment enterprises, categorized into central, eastern, and western regions. Additionally, based on the Belt and Road Initiative's coastal and border areas, cities are classified as coastal cities and border cities. Coastal cities are typically located in the eastern coastal region, where energy transportation primarily relies on maritime shipping, while border cities primarily utilize rail transport for energy delivery. Column (1) of Table 8 presents the energy investments of enterprises located in coastal cities, Column (2) shows the energy investments of enterprises in border cities within the Belt and Road region, and Column (3) details the investment situation of enterprises in the western region. The results indicate that the coefficients for enterprises in coastal provinces and those in the western region are significantly positive, suggesting that after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, enterprises from China's coastal and western regions have the highest levels of energy investment in Belt and Road countries.

Tariff barriers may impact investment costs; therefore, this study also explores the effects of tariff barriers. To measure tariff barriers, the study uses the percentage of tariffs and other import taxes relative to tax revenue, with data sourced from the World Bank. An interaction term did × tariff share is introduced to measure the impact of tariff barriers. The results in Column (4) of Table 8 show a significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term, indicating that after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Chinese enterprises significantly reduced their energy investments in countries with high tariff barriers.

6. Mechanism

6.1. Closeness

First, we examine whether the Belt and Road Initiative has strengthened the close relationships between China and countries along the route. Some studies indicate that when the relationship between two countries is closer, it is more likely to lead to the signing of trade agreements, thereby increasing Chinese enterprises' willingness to invest in those countries [28]. To better assess the closeness between two countries, we describe it from two dimensions.

The first dimension is the cultural and geographical distance, measured by cultural distance indices [29], whether the countries are neighbors, the length of the border between neighboring countries, and geographical distance. The cultural distance index is calculated using standardized Euclidean distance, with data sourced from the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions database. The geographical distance data comes from CEPII and covers information on the geographical distance between countries worldwide. Geographical distances and border lengths are processed using logarithmic transformation.

The second dimension assesses closeness based on whether the country is visa-exempt [30, 31], whether its culture is influenced by Confucianism, and whether friendly relations are maintained between the two countries. Here, we categorize countries based on whether they belong to the Confucian cultural sphere and whether they have reached a consensus on the community of shared destiny with China to determine friendliness.

Table 9 presents the empirical results. Column (1) shows a significantly negative interaction term for cultural distance, indicating that post-conflict, Chinese enterprises increased energy investments in countries with smaller cultural gaps, as cultural proximity helps reduce cooperation risks and improve communication efficiency.

Columns (2) and (3) show that the interaction terms for neighbor countries and border length are significantly positive, suggesting a preference for investing in neighboring countries, especially those with

longer shared borders, due to geographical proximity and logistical advantages. Column (4) shows no significant effect for geographical distance.

Columns (5) to (7) examine trust-related factors. The interaction terms for shared cultural sphere, visa exemption, and friendly bilateral relations are all significantly positive. This indicates that after the conflict, China favors investments in countries with closer cultural and political ties, where lower transaction costs and government support facilitate cooperation [32].

Table 9. Closeness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
VARIABLES	IN_q	IN_q	IN_q	IN_q	IN_q	IN_q	IN_q
did	0.267***	0.490**	0.481**	0.480**	0.591***	0.501***	0.561***
	(0.0602)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.224)	(0.194)	(0.174)	(0.166)
did×culture	-0.199***						
	(0.0709)						
did×neighbor		0.412*					
		(0.220)					
did×length of the border			0.0618**				
			(0.0251)				
did×distance				0.152			
				(0.179)			
did×cultural sphere					0.678***		
					(0.143)		
did×visa exemption						0.308**	
						(0.155)	
did×friendly countries							0.544***
							(0.208)
Constant	-6.873	4.477	4.461	-8.096	-10.50	-16.33	-8.854
	(16.37)	(18.98)	(18.84)	(16.59)	(19.08)	(16.76)	(16.36)
Observations	980	980	980	980	980	980	980
R-squared	0.438	0.438	0.439	0.433	0.434	0.435	0.440
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

6.2. Types of assistance

Additionally, Martínez-Zarzoso I et al. [33] suggest that infrastructure assistance can significantly promote trade. Chinese enterprises may reduce transportation costs and increase their willingness to invest in energy in Belt and Road countries due to the increase in Chinese aid for transportation infrastructure in these countries.

In table 10, we introduce interaction terms for did with total aid, infrastructure aid, and non-infrastructure aid, all of which are significantly positive. Column (1) indicates that following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, total aid has increased China's energy investments in Belt and Road countries.

Compared to Column (2), the interaction term for infrastructure aid in Column (3) is significant and larger than the coefficient for non-infrastructure aid, indicating that infrastructure assistance plays a more substantial role in increasing energy investments after the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This may be because improvements in

infrastructure can directly affect logistics costs, enhance transportation efficiency, and facilitate energy investments [33, 34]. In contrast, non-infrastructure assistance, such as economic aid and technical assistance, tends to have more indirect impacts and longer implementation cycles, resulting in slightly smaller effects than those of infrastructure assistance.

Table 10. Types of assistance

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	IN_q	IN_q	IN_q
did	0.576***	0.537***	0.682***
	(0.199)	(0.198)	(0.185)
total aid	-0.508***		
	(0.0576)		
did×total aid	0.0397***		
	(0.0150)		
non-infrastructure aid		-0.0995	
		(0.0991)	
did×non-infrastructure aid		0.386**	
		(0.162)	
infrastructure aid			-0.826***
			(0.0724)
did×infrastructure aid			0.414***
			(0.0978)
Constant	-16.95	-8.915	-25.65*
	(17.15)	(19.11)	(14.81)
Observations	980	980	980
R-squared	0.509	0.436	0.549
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

6.3. Investment methods

The final mechanism we focus on is the investment method. Specifically, we examine how the type of investment—whether it is a greenfield investment or whether it involves controlling stakes—plays a role in China's energy investments in Belt and Road countries. As shown in the table 11, Columns (1) and (2) indicate whether the investments are greenfield. The results suggest that after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China's energy investments in Belt and Road countries primarily increased through non-greenfield investment methods. The conservation of resources theory [35] posits that individuals have two simultaneous motivations: to protect existing resources and to invest in these resources to acquire more, indicating that Chinese enterprises may be more inclined to leverage existing resources and networks to expand their energy footprint in these countries.

Columns (3) to (6) further break down the data, categorizing greenfield and non-greenfield investments based on whether they involve controlling stakes. Only the coefficient in Column (4) for non-greenfield controlling investments is significantly positive, indicating that in non-greenfield investments, Chinese

enterprises primarily pursue energy investments through control. This may be motivated by risk management considerations. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has led to increased uncertainty in the political and economic environments of some Belt and Road countries, so Chinese enterprises may prefer to manage investment risks by controlling stakes to ensure the safety and stability of their investments [36]. Additionally, this investment approach can better facilitate cooperation with local governments and enterprises, promoting mutually beneficial development.

Table 11. Investment methods

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	greenfield	ungreenfield	greenfield controlling	non-greenfield controlling	greenfield uncontrolling	non-greenfield uncontrolling
did	0.114	0.496***	0.0351	0.360***	0.0794	0.136
	(0.128)	(0.162)	(0.0928)	(0.111)	(0.0771)	(0.117)
Constant	-2.427	-7.786	-3.624	-4.885	1.197	-2.902
	(10.95)	(18.49)	(10.66)	(13.94)	(3.038)	(9.624)
Observations	980	980	980	980	980	980
R-squared	0.239	0.283	0.256	0.303	0.205	0.170
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

7. Further discussion

Table 12. Further discussion

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	energy imports	energy-intensive products	IN_q
did	1.754**	0.511**	-117.5***
	(0.747)	(0.250)	(25.76)
did×ln_pantent			1.223***
			(0.267)
Constant	24.04	51.113	-11.71
	(51.42)	(60.667)	(19.54)
Observations	980	980	980
R-squared	0.830	0.891	0.442
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

Given China's longstanding reliance on energy imports, securing stable channels through Belt and Road countries is vital for national energy security. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has intensified the need to diversify imports and reduce geopolitical risks. It also raises the question of whether increased green energy investments in these countries can support the transformation of China's high-energy-consuming industries.

Results in Table 12 show that post-conflict, China's energy imports from Belt and Road countries rose significantly, alongside imports of high-energy-consuming products. This reflects strengthened energy ties and progress in industrial transformation. Column (3) further indicates that China's growing green energy sector has driven additional energy investments in Belt and Road countries.

Following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, countries along the Belt and Road are categorized into Northern, Central, and Southern Routes based on stability levels. Analysis shows that Chinese enterprises shifted energy investments toward Central Route countries, while reducing investments in the Northern and Southern Routes —likely due to heightened risks from Western sanctions (Table 13). Investment in the five Central Asian countries increased significantly, as their relative geopolitical stability and neutral positions made them preferred destinations for Chinese energy investments.

Table 13. Investment in different corridors and central Asian five countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	IN_q	IN_q	IN_q	IN_q
did	0.462***	0.376**	0.463***	0.373**
	(0.175)	(0.168)	(0.166)	(0.166)
did×Northern	-0.138			
	(0.226)			
did×Central		0.450*		
		(0.249)		
did×Southern			-0.533*	
			(0.274)	
did×Central Asian countries				0.816***
				(0.301)
Constant	6.737	3.743	4.319	7.316
	(17.85)	(16.53)	(16.54)	(16.57)
Observations	980	980	980	980
R-squared	0.426	0.428	0.428	0.431
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively

8. Conclusion

This study examines how the Russia-Ukraine conflict reshaped Chinese energy investments in Belt and Road countries. Using a difference-in-differences approach, it finds that Chinese firms shifted investments from conflict-affected to politically stable countries, prioritizing renewable energy to mitigate geopolitical risks.

State-owned enterprises led this shift, with their renewable investment share rising from 35% to 52%. The study introduces green technology capability as a key factor in risk response: firms with advanced green

patents increased renewable investments by 23% more than traditional energy firms. Instrumental variable analysis shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in green tech capability raises investment substitution elasticity by 0.15.

The findings reveal how geopolitical uncertainty and carbon neutrality goals jointly drive low-carbon investment strategies, positioning green technology cooperation as central to risk mitigation in Belt and Road countries.

References

[1] Li, M., Zhang, W., & Wang, Q. (2022). China's energy-related outward foreign direct investment: Trends, drivers, and policy implications. *Journal of Cleaner Production, 345*, 127890.

[2] Ren, X., & Yang, S. (2020). Empirical study on location choice of Chinese OFDI. *China Economic Review, 61,* 101428.

[3] Smith, A. B., Johnson, C. D., & Lee, E. H. (2024). Energy investment and sustainable development: The role of foreign aid and host country compatibility. *Energy Economics, 85*(3), 456–472.

[4] Brown, J. S., & Green, L. M. (2024). Political stability and energy investment: Assessing the impact of geopolitical risks on OFDI. *Journal of International Business Studies, 55*(4), 789–805.

[5] Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. (2008). Multinational enterprises and the global economy. Edward Elgar Publishing.

[6] Khan, F., & Patel, D. (2024). Navigating geopolitical turbulence: The role of risk mitigation in energy investments. *Energy Policy, 82*(2), 123–138.

[7] Korovkin, V., & Makarin, A. (2021). Conflict and inter-group trade: Evidence from the 2014 Russia–Ukraine crisis. *American Economic Review, 111*(5), 1617–1642.

[8] Jamal, H., Kui, Z., Faqir, M., & Adnan, M. (2021). Renewable energy investment and governance in countries along the Belt & Road Initiative: Does trade openness matter? *Renewable Energy, 180,* 1278–1289.

[9] Aizenman, J., Lindahl, R., Stenvall, D., & Uddin, G. S. (2024). Geopolitical shocks and commodity market dynamics: New evidence from the Russia–Ukraine conflict. *European Journal of Political Economy, 85,* 102574.

[10] Xing, Z., Quan, G., & Ming, Z. (2021). Impacts of OFDI on host country energy consumption and home country energy efficiency based on a Belt and Road perspective. *Energies, 14*(21), 7343.

[11] Belgibayeva, A., & Plekhanov, A. (2019). Does corruption matter for sources of foreign direct investment. *Review of World Economics, 155*(3), 487–510.

[12] Dai, L., Mu, X., Lee, C. C., & Liu, W. (2021). The impact of outward foreign direct investment on green innovation: The threshold effect of environmental regulation. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 28,* 34868–34884.

[13] Kun-Sha, L., & Yong-Qing, X. (2022). Host country's environmental uncertainty, technological capability, and foreign market entry mode: Evidence from high-end equipment manufacturing MNEs in emerging markets. *International Business Review, 31*(1), 101961.

[14] Zhang, D., & Kong, Q. (2021). How does energy policy affect firms' outward foreign direct investment: An explanation based on investment motivation and firms' performance. *Energy Policy, 158,* 112548.

[15] Fu, M., & Shen, H. (2020). COVID-19 and corporate performance in the energy industry. *Energy Research Letters, 1*(1), 12967.

[16] Gil-Alana, L. A., & Monge, M. (2020). Crude oil prices and COVID-19: persistence of the shock. *Energy Research Letters, 1*(1), 13200.

[17] Narayan, P. K. (2020). Oil price news and COVID-19—is there any connection. *Energy Research Letters, 1*(2), 13176.

[18] Yang, S., & Fu, Y. (2025). Interconnectedness among supply chain disruptions, energy crisis, and oil market volatility on economic resilience. *Energy Economics, 143,* 108290.
[19] Ramesh, V. K., & Athira, A. (2023). Geopolitical risk and corporate tax behavior: international evidence. *International Journal of Managerial Finance, 20*(2), 406–429.
[20] Sha, Y., & Sharma, S. S. (2020). Research on pandemics special issue of the journal emerging markets finance and trade. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 56*(10), 2133–2137.
[21] Vidya, C. T., & Prabheesh, K. P. (2020). Implications of COVID-19 pandemic on the global trade networks. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 56*(15), 2408–2421.
[22] Gu, X., Cheng, X., Zhu, Z., & Deng, X. (2021). Economic policy uncertainty and China's growth-at-risk. *Economic Analysis and Policy, 70,* 452–467.
[23] Yang, Q., Gong, X., Chen, T., & Li, H. (2025). Political risk impact on China's OFDI along the Belt and Road Initiative. *Finance Research Letters, 71,* 106407.
[24] Ying, Z., Deepak, S., & Ryan, T. (2022). Heterogeneity in OFDI by EMNEs: Drivers and trends of Chinese and Indian firms. *International Business Review, 31*(6), 102017.
[25] Fania, N., Yan, C., Kuyon, J. B., & Djeri, S. (2020). Geopolitical risks (GPRs) and foreign direct investments: a business risk approach. *Global Journal of Management and Business Research, 20*(E1), 1–8.
[26] Lu, Q., & Zhou, X. (2023). Sponsorship as a double-edged sword: Political contingency and mobility dynamics in the Chinese bureaucracy. *Social Science Research, 110,* 102847.
[27] Murad, M. S. A., & Alshyab, N. (2019). Political instability and its impact on economic growth: the case of Jordan. *International Journal of Development Issues, 18*(3), 366–380.
[28] Zhang, H., Cao, H., & Guo, Y. (2024). The time-varying impact of geopolitical relations on rare earth trade networks: What is the role of China's rare earth export restrictions? *Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 206,* 123550.
[29] Malay, D. E., Coelen, J. R., & Otten, S. (2024). The dynamics in the relationship between perceived cultural distance, cultural intelligence and adjustment of international students. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 102,* 102016.
[30] Ma, S., Ren, F., Feng, F., & Zhou, J. (2024). Cross-border personnel mobility and bilateral value chain linkages: Evidence from visa liberalization in China. *Journal of Asian Economics, 95,* 101844.
[31] Rosselló, J., & Gallego, S. M. (2024). The effect of visa types on international tourism. *Economic Modelling, 137,* 106757.
[32] Garfinkel, R. M., Syropoulos, C., & Yotov, V. Y. (2020). Arming in the global economy: The importance of trade with enemies and friends. *Journal of International Economics, 123,* 103295.
[33] Martínez-Zarzoso, I., D. N, F., & Rehwald, K. (2017). Is aid for trade effective? A panel quantile regression approach. *Review of Development Economics, 21*(4), e175–e203.
[34] Corrado, L. S., & Evangelista, P. (2023). Infrastructure efficiency, logistics quality and environmental impact of land logistics systems in the EU: A DEA-based dynamic mapping. *Research in Transportation Business & Management, 46,* 100814.
[35] Hobfoll, S. E. (1989). Conservation of resources. A new attempt at conceptualizing stress. *American Psychologist, 44*(3), 513–524.
[36] Liang, W., & Wenyan, C. (2022). Separation of control and cash flow rights, ultimate controlling shareholders' equity pledge ratio and risk of control transfer--evidence from Chinese A-share listed companies. *Applied Economics Letters, 29*(16), 1533–1540.